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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is a petition for review of a final order of removal.  
The Board of Immigration Appeals found that Nelson 
Quinteros committed an aggravated felony and failed to show 
entitlement to relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT).  Quinteros argues that the Board committed two errors:  
First, the Board erred in finding that his conviction for 
conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon was an 
aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA); second, the Board erred in applying our precedent on 
the Convention Against Torture.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will vacate the Board’s decision and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
I. 
Nelson Quinteros and his mother came to the United 
States from El Salvador in 2001, when he was eight-years-old.  
They settled in New York.  When he was thirteen, Quinteros 
joined the gang MS-13.  He has a New York Yankees tattoo 
that he asserts symbolizes that his particular gang is based in 
New York.   
 
In 2011, Quinteros was indicted for conspiracy to 
commit assault with a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 
1959(a)(6).  Quinteros and other gang members discussed over 
the phone that they would assault members of Surenos, a rival 
gang.  Quinteros drove other gang members to a Surenos 
location, but the Surenos “backed down.”1  No assault took 
                                                 
1 AR 1057–58.   
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place.  Quinteros later pled guilty to conspiracy to commit 
assault with a dangerous weapon.  He was sentenced to thirty 
months’ imprisonment.   
 
In prison, Quinteros left MS-13 to follow Christianity.  
When he told other MS-13 members in prison that he was no 
longer in the gang, they would reply with statements like, 
“Well, when you get deported and you go back to El Salvador, 
things are going to change.  There’s no getting out over there.”2     
 
When Quinteros’s sentence ended, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings.  
DHS placed Quinteros in expedited proceedings after it 
determined that Quinteros had been convicted of an aggravated 
felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  In 
2014, Quinteros was issued a Form I-851 Notice of Intent to 
Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order.  The Form I-851 
charged Quinteros as removable for having committed an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), and 
(J) and allowed Quinteros to contest his removability.  He 
checked the box to contest his deportability and indicated he 
would attach documents supporting his request.  He failed to 
follow up with additional documentation.  
 
Quinteros then sought withholding of removal.  An 
asylum officer determined that Quinteros demonstrated a 
reasonable fear that he would be tortured in El Salvador.  The 
officer referred Quinteros to an Immigration Judge (IJ).   
 
Before the IJ, Quinteros attempted to show that he 
would be tortured in El Salvador.  He also sought to show that 
                                                 
2 Id. at 560 l. 20–21.  
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the police would, at the very least, be unlikely to protect him 
and, at worst, would directly perpetrate violence against him.  
Quinteros testified on his own behalf and presented the 
testimony of Dr. Thomas Boerman, a country conditions 
expert.  Quinteros also relied on several studies and reports.  
Most relevant for this appeal, Quinteros submitted a study from 
the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic 
(Harvard study) that discussed the perception and treatment of 
individuals with tattoos in El Salvador.   
 
A. Quinteros’s Testimony 
Quinteros gave several reasons why he would be 
recognizable as a gang member in El Salvador.  He 
“anticipate[d] that he would be readily identified as a deportee 
because of his distinct accent and his ‘NY Yankees’ tattoo.”3  
He testified that he knows seventy other gang members, who 
have been deported to El Salvador, and has cousins in MS-13.   
 
Quinteros also offered anecdotal evidence that other 
former gang members, deported to El Salvador, had been 
harassed or killed.  Quinteros did not believe that the police 
would protect him.  He testified that other MS-13 members in 
New York had sent money to the police in El Salvador to 
secure protection for the gang there.  He thought that the police 
would not get involved in gang-on-gang violence because the 
police would have little to gain.  
 
B. Dr. Boerman’s Testimony 
Dr. Boerman testified as an expert on conditions in El 
                                                 
3 Id. at 461. 
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Salvador and corroborated much of Quinteros’s testimony.  He 
detailed several iterations of largely ineffectual Salvadoran 
government policies to combat gang violence.  First, he 
described a set of 2003 laws that criminalized gang 
membership, resulting in the arrest of 20,000 people. 
Ultimately, however, few people were charged for gang 
offenses.  These laws remain on the books, but at the time of 
Dr. Boerman’s testimony in 2015, he testified that most arrests 
of suspected gang members resulted in a short period of 
detention and no charges.  When charges are filed, gang 
members are usually acquitted “because of the effect of witness 
intimidation, terrorization, and murder.”4   
 
Then came a gang truce from 2012 to 2014 that 
appeared to have decreased homicides.  But this truce was 
discredited after authorities discovered a substantial “increase 
in the use of clandestine cemeteries.”5  Some researchers 
believe that the supposed truce actually strengthened the gangs 
and increased violence.        
 
In 2014, a new president attempted to implement a new 
anti-gang policy.  That plan also stalled.  Although the 
government has labeled the gangs, including MS-13, “terrorist 
groups,”6 and has authorized the use of El Salvador’s anti-
terrorism laws to combat them, it is not clear whether the 
government has implemented these laws.   
 
Dr. Boerman also described a “‘disconnect’ between 
                                                 
4 Id. at 674. 
5 Id. at 666. 
6 Id. at 670. 
 
7 
 
official policy and actual practice.”7  For example, although 
trained on human rights, some “officers have sought 
permission to form groups that carry out assassinations as an 
official state function.”8  According to Dr. Boerman, the 
Salvadoran government no longer investigates police killings 
of gang members.   
 
Dr. Boerman detailed a special risk of harm for former 
gang members.  When the U.S. deports an individual, it 
provides the country to which the deportee is returning with the 
deportee’s gang affiliation and information about his tattoos.  
Dr. Boerman provided anecdotal evidence that immigration 
officers, police, and military in El Salvador have subjected 
suspected gang members to physical violence during the 
customs process.  Gang members and police easily identify 
newcomers to a community and take great pains to determine 
their background, including stripping them down to check for 
tattoos.  Dr. Boerman also stated that a New York Yankees 
tattoo is “commonly recognized as gang affiliated from the 
United States, in the east coast.”9  The police or a gang would 
interpret that tattoo “as gang related.”10  Efforts to remove the 
tattoo would result in scarring that would likewise raise 
suspicions of gang affiliation.    
 
C. Agency Proceedings 
After conducting hearings, the IJ denied Quinteros’s 
                                                 
7 Id. at 466. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 683. 
10 Id. at 683–84.  
 
8 
 
request for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  
The IJ found that Quinteros “ha[d] shown a clear likelihood 
that he would be killed or tortured by members of MS-13 and 
[rival] gangs”11 but had not shown that the Salvadoran police 
would be willfully blind to that torture.  The IJ found that the 
“escalating violence” in El Salvador, although “alarming,” was 
“stemming from war-like conditions” and did “not necessarily 
mean that the government is abdicating its responsibility to 
protect the public.”12    
 
The IJ also determined that Quinteros’s crime was an 
aggravated felony.  The IJ applied the modified categorical 
approach and found that Quinteros’s crime was a crime of 
violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and that conspiracy 
did not require an overt act.13   
 
Quinteros appealed the IJ’s CAT findings, making no 
mention of the aggravated felony finding.  The BIA affirmed.  
Quinteros appealed.  We granted the government’s request to 
remand, in light of our decision in Myrie v. Attorney General,14 
in order to determine if the Salvadoran government, more 
likely than not, would acquiesce in Quinteros’s torture by gang 
members  
 
On remand, both Quinteros and the government offered 
                                                 
11 Id. at 477. 
12 Id. at 479. 
13 A crime of violence is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), and a conspiracy to commit a crime of 
violence is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(U). 
14 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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additional, updated evidence on conditions in El Salvador.  
Because the effect of Quinteros’s evidence was essentially the 
same, the second IJ adopted the first IJ’s finding that Quinteros 
had shown a likelihood of being killed or tortured by gangs and 
similarly found that the Salvadoran officials’ likely response 
would not constitute acquiescence.  The IJ noted that he had 
reviewed Quinteros’s prior and current testimony, Dr. 
Boerman’s prior testimony and written declaration, and all 
other supporting materials in conjunction with United States 
Department of State country condition reports.15  The IJ rested 
his findings on the new efforts El Salvador was taking to 
combat gang violence and the lack of evidence that a Yankees 
tattoo was a gang symbol. 
 
Quinteros appealed to the Board.  While his appeal was 
pending, the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya16 
invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as unconstitutionally vague.  
Quinteros moved to remand based on Dimaya.  The Board then 
determined that, because Quinteros was in expedited removal 
proceedings, he could not challenge his status as an aggravated 
felon.17  In a footnote, the Board noted that Quinteros was 
subject to expedited removal proceedings because he 
committed an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(F), (U), and (J).18  To accept such logic would 
                                                 
15 AR 130. 
16 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). 
17 AR 8. 
18 Section 1101(a)(43)(J) classifies certain racketeering 
offenses as aggravated felonies.  Although the DHS Notice of 
Intent listed subsections (F), (U), and (J) as the basis for its 
aggravated felony finding, the first IJ found Quinteros 
removable only under (F) and (U). 
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render it impossible for anyone in such a situation to challenge 
their status before the BIA. 
 
The Board affirmed the denial of Quinteros’s CAT 
claim.  In doing so, the Board reversed the IJ’s finding on the 
likelihood of torture as clearly erroneous, questioning whether 
Quinteros would even be recognized as a current or former 
gang member.  The Board also noted that Quinteros had not 
shown that his tattoo was visible or that it would signify to 
others that he was a current or former gang member.  The 
Board agreed with the IJ that Quinteros failed to show 
acquiescence by state actors, noting the new “extraordinary 
measures” El Salvador was taking “to combat gang 
violence.”19     
 
Quinteros petitioned this Court for review of the finding 
that his conviction is an aggravated felony and, in light of 
Dimaya, of the Board’s denial of his motion to remand.  
Quinteros also alleges that the Board committed legal error in 
denying CAT relief. 
 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over final orders of removal under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  The government argues that where, as 
here, the agency has found that an alien committed an 
aggravated felony, we have no jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(C) to review the removal order.  Nevertheless, we 
retain jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of 
                                                 
19 AR 6. 
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law.”20  If “the BIA issues a decision on the merits and not 
simply a summary affirmance, we review the BIA’s, and not 
the IJ’s, decision.”21  We also review those portions of the IJ 
decision that the Board adopts or defers to.22      
    
III. 
A. This Court has jurisdiction to consider whether 
Quinteros was convicted of an aggravated felony. 
 
 The first question we must answer is whether we have 
jurisdiction to hear Quinteros’s challenge to the aggravated 
felony finding.  The government argues that Quinteros failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not 
challenge the aggravated felony finding in response to the 
initial notice of intent to issue a final administrative removal 
order.  Quinteros argues that he did all that was required:  He 
checked the box on the BIA form that indicated he disagreed 
with the finding of removability.23  Although generally an alien 
                                                 
20 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). 
21 Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006). 
22 Id.  See also Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
23 The parties’ arguments highlight a circuit split over what an 
alien must do on appeal to have properly preserved a challenge 
to DHS’s aggravated felony finding.  The Eleventh Circuit held 
that failure to contest one’s classification as an aggravated 
felon in response to a final administrative removal order 
deprives the reviewing court of jurisdiction because the alien 
has not exhausted administrative remedies.  Malu v. United 
States Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014).  The 
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is required to exhaust his administrative remedies—a 
jurisdictional requirement24—an agency revives an alien’s 
unexhausted claim when it sua sponte considers an issue.25  
Here, the first IJ sua sponte determined that Quinteros’s 
conviction was for an aggravated felony under § 
1101(a)(43)(F) and (U).  
 
Although Quinteros did not challenge on appeal the IJ’s 
aggravated felony finding, he did file a motion to remand to the 
IJ, challenging his removability as an aggravated felon.  The 
Board considered this motion to remand and concluded that 
Quinteros could not challenge the aggravated felon 
determination in expedited removal proceedings.  Because the 
Board had the opportunity to consider Quinteros’s challenge to 
his removability as an aggravated felon and declined to do so 
                                                 
Fourth Circuit held that an alien in expedited removal 
proceedings can raise only factual challenges in administrative 
proceedings and so the reviewing court has jurisdiction over 
legal challenges to removability “in the first instance on 
appeal.”  Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 2015).  
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held similarly.  Valdiviez-
Hernandez v. Holder, 739 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2013); 
Victoria-Faustino v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 
2017).  We need not wade into this circuit split because here, 
the agency took up Quinteros’s challenge sua sponte.    
24 Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2005).  A 
court cannot hear a claim unless “an alien has exhausted all 
administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 
25 Lin v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 543 F.3d 114, 123–25 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
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on the merits, the aggravated felony issue is exhausted for 
purposes of appeal.26    
 
 Moreover, we always retain jurisdiction to determine 
our own jurisdiction.27  As we have said before, this principle 
extends to “jurisdiction to address [the] jurisdictional 
prerequisite . . . of . . . ‘whether an alien was convicted of a 
non-reviewable aggravated felony.’”28  We will therefore first 
determine whether Quinteros was convicted of an aggravated 
felony.  Our review of this issue is “de novo as it implicates a 
purely legal question.”29     
 
B. Quinteros did not commit an aggravated felony. 
 DHS charged Quinteros as deportable for being 
convicted of an aggravated felony under 2 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(43)(F), (J), and (U).  Subsection (F) applies to a crime 
of violence using the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16.30  Subsection 
                                                 
26 We have previously found jurisdiction where a party 
includes an issue in the Notice of Appeal to the BIA but fails 
to include the issue in the brief to the BIA and the BIA does 
not address the issue.  See Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 158, 
161 (3d Cir. 2009).  
27 Restrepo v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 617 F.3d 787, 790 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251, 253 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2006)).   
28 Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 790. 
29 Id. 
30 Section 16 defines crime of violence as:  “(a) on offense that 
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) 
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(J) applies to several racketeering offenses.  Subsection (U) 
applies to an “attempt or conspiracy to commit” an aggravated 
felony.     
 
 When determining whether a particular offense is an 
aggravated felony, we apply the categorical approach.31  Under 
the strict categorical approach, we compare the state statute of 
conviction with “the federal statute enumerating categories of 
crimes” without regard to “the underlying facts.”32  In applying 
the categorical approach, we are to “presume that the 
conviction ‘rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] 
acts’ criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts 
are encompassed by the generic federal offense.”33   
 
 Quinteros was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6).  
That section states: 
 
(a) Whoever, as consideration for the 
receipt of, or as consideration for a 
promise or agreement to pay, 
                                                 
any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person 
or property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.” 
31 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 188 (2013); United 
States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing 
categorical approach as applying to both federal and state 
convictions). 
32 Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2004). 
33 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 (2013) (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)) (alterations in 
original). 
15 
 
anything of pecuniary value from 
an enterprise engaged in 
racketeering activity, or for the 
purpose of gaining entrance to or 
maintaining or increasing position 
in an enterprise engaged in 
racketeering activity, murders, 
kidnaps, maims, assaults with a 
dangerous weapon, commits 
assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury upon, or threatens to 
commit a crime of violence against 
any individual in violation of the 
laws of any State or the United 
States, or attempts or conspires so 
to do, shall be punished— 
. . . 
(6) for attempting or conspiring to 
commit a crime involving 
maiming, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, or assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury . . . .”34    
 
 Because Quinteros’s statute of conviction is “an 
alternatively phrased statute,” we must first “determine 
whether its listed items are elements or means.”35  If the 
alternatives are elements, some of which would qualify as an 
aggravated felony and some of which would not, then the 
modified categorical approach applies, and we can look to 
                                                 
34 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6). 
35 Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2256 (2016). 
 
16 
 
documents, related to the crime as committed, to determine 
“which of the enumerated alternatives played a part in the 
[petitioner’s] prior conviction, and then compare that element 
(along with all others) to those of the generic crime.”36 
 
1. Quinteros’s conviction was not a crime of violence 
under § 1101(a)(43)(F). 
 Section 1101(a)(43)(F) employs the crime of violence 
definition from 18 U.S.C. § 16.  The first IJ found that § 
1959(a)(6) constituted a crime of violence as defined in 
§ 16(b).  Because the Supreme Court found that § 16(b) was 
unconstitutionally vague, the IJ’s aggravated felony finding 
based on § 16(b) cannot stand.37   
 
 Neither could Quinteros’s conviction be a crime of 
violence under § 16(a), a ground the first IJ did not consider.  
Section 16(a) defines a crime of violence as “an offense that 
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another.”38  
Looking at the least culpable conduct, an individual could be 
convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6) without 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. 
                                                 
36 Id.  
37 Because we hold that the IJ’s aggravated felony finding 
under § 16(b) was in error after Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 
1204, we need not address whether the Board’s denial of 
Quinteros’s motion to remand was error. 
38 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). 
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2. Quinteros’s conviction was not a conspiracy or 
attempt to commit a crime of violence under § 
1101(a)(43)(U). 
 
 Next, we determine if Quinteros was convicted of an 
aggravated felony under       § 1101(a)(43)(U) for “an attempt 
or conspiracy to commit” a crime of violence.39  Using the 
categorical approach, we compare the statute of conviction, 
§ 1959(a)(6), with generic conspiracy as used in the INA, § 
1101(a)(43)(U).  A conviction under § 1959(a)(6) does not 
require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.40  We 
must determine whether the INA’s generic definition of 
conspiracy requires an overt act.  We hold that it does. 
                                                 
39 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U).  
40 Generally, where the statutory text “does not expressly make 
the commission of an overt act an element of the conspiracy 
offense, the government need not prove an overt act to obtain 
a conviction.”  Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 214 
(2005).  See also United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 
339 (3d Cir. 2014) (declining to find an overt act requirement 
for Hobbs Act conspiracy where the statute “makes no mention 
of a required act”).  Other Circuits examining § 1959(a)(6), or 
similar subsections, have generally not required an overt act.  
See, e.g., United States v. McCollum, 885 F.3d 300, 309 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) does not require 
an overt act); United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(finding no overt act required for § 1959(a)(6)).  Only in an 
unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion did a panel note that the jury 
had to be unanimous on an overt act for a conviction under § 
1959(a)(6).  See United States v. Franco, 745 F. App’x 285, 
287 (9th Cir. 2018).   
 
18 
 
 The government argues that the BIA’s interpretation of 
§ 1101(a)(43)(U) is entitled to deference.41  Generally, 
Chevron principles apply “to an agency’s consistent 
interpretation of the statute it administers,”42 including the 
INA.43  “[T]he issue of Chevron deference to the BIA’s 
evaluation of criminal statutes in light of the INA has generated 
some controversy and confusion.”44  We defer to the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of a statute only if the text of the 
statute is “unclear” and we cannot “discern congressional 
intent by utilizing various tools of statutory construction.”45  
We find no reason to defer to the BIA here because the 
meaning of “conspiracy” in § 1101(a)(43)(U) of the INA is 
unambiguous when employing the ordinary tools of statutory 
construction. 
 
                                                 
41 The government relies primarily on Matter of Richardson, 
25 I&N Dec. 226 (BIA 2010).   
42 Matter of Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 924 (3d Cir. 1994). 
43 See Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2001).  
“[U]npublished, single-member BIA decisions are not entitled 
to Chevron deference.”  Mahn v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 
767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).  But, here, the IJ relied on 
Matter of Richardson, 25 I&N Dec. 226 (BIA 2010), a 
published decision of a panel of the Board that held that 
conspiracy under § 1101(a)(43)(U) does not require an overt 
act.   
44 Lewin v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 885 F.3d 165, 169 (3d 
Cir. 2018).  At least once, we unhesitatingly applied Chevron 
and deferred to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the INA.  
Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 796.  
45 Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 792. 
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 Where Congress has not specifically defined a word in 
a statute, we presume the common law definition applies.46  
But the presumption that a term be given its common-law 
meaning does not apply when the common law “meaning is 
obsolete or inconsistent with the statute’s purpose.”47  In those 
instances, the approach taken “in the criminal codes of most 
states” replaces the common law definition.48  We have stated 
before that, when determining the elements of the generic 
crime, we look to “the Model Penal Code (MPC), state laws, 
and learned treatises.”49  But “the most important factor in 
defining the generic version of an offense is the approach of 
the majority of state statutes defining the crime.”50  We 
therefore contrast the common law definition of conspiracy 
with the majority of states’ definition of conspiracy and hold 
that conspiracy in § 1101(a)(43)(U) requires an overt act. 
 
 At common law, the crime of conspiracy was complete 
                                                 
46 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990) (citing 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)). 
47 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 594. 
48 Id. at 598.  The Supreme Court in Taylor applied this 
approach to interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) for purposes of 
sentencing enhancement.  Later, the Supreme Court applied 
this same principle to interpreting “theft offense” under the 
INA.  See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 190 
(2007). 
49 United States v. Graves, 877 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(interpreting the career offender provisions of the Sentencing 
Guidelines). 
50 Id. at 504. 
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upon the making of an agreement.51  But now, the large 
majority of states also require an overt act.52  So does the 
MPC.53  Although some courts have continued to apply the 
common law definition,54 the meaning of conspiracy has 
changed.  The overt act requirement was an attempt to rein in 
expansive conspiracy liability,55 “guarding against the 
punishment of evil intent alone, and . . . assur[ing] that a 
criminal agreement actually existed.”56  We think this change 
significant and apply the modern overt act requirement 
reflected in the statutes of a majority of states and the MPC.  
Because Quinteros’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6) 
does not require an overt act, his conviction is not a categorical 
match for conspiracy under the INA.  Thus he is not an 
aggravated felon under Subsection U. 
 
3. Quinteros’s conviction was not a racketeering offense 
under § 1101(a)(43)(J). 
 The government has argued that we need not reach the 
                                                 
51 United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1994) 
(quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)). 
52 United States v. Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 534–35 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (“A survey of state conspiracy statutes reveals that 
the vast majority demand an overt act to sustain conviction.”). 
53 See Model Penal Code § 5.03(5) (Am. Law Inst. 1985) 
(requiring overt acts for all crimes “other than a felony of the 
first or second degree”).  
54 Etienne, 813 F.3d at 145. 
55 Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d at 536–37. 
56 Id. at 537. 
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question of whether Quinteros was convicted of an aggravated 
felony for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(J).  The Board noted in a 
footnote, without explaining its reasoning, that Quinteros’s 
conviction was an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(J).  
Although DHS had included this charge in the Form I-851, this 
was not a ground that either the IJ or the BIA had previously 
addressed in the proceedings.  Generally, “[w]hen deficiencies 
in the BIA’s decision make it impossible for us to meaningfully 
review its decision, we must vacate that decision and remand 
so that the BIA can further explain its reasoning.”57  But where, 
as here, the BIA has failed to conduct the categorical approach 
and the BIA’s application of the categorical approach would 
not be accorded deference, we have considered the question de 
novo.58  So too here. 
 
Quinteros’s conviction for conspiracy to commit assault 
with a dangerous weapon is not an aggravated felony as 
defined in § 1101(a)(43)(J).  Subsection J makes an aggravated 
felony any offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1955, or 
1962.  Sections 1084 and 1955 deal only with gambling-related 
offenses—for which Quinteros’s conviction cannot be a 
categorical match.  This leaves offenses described in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962, which fall under the general category of racketeering 
offenses.  Although Quinteros’s statute of conviction for 
conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon bears 
the title of “violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity,” § 
                                                 
57 Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2003).  See 
also Cruz v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“Where a BIA opinion leaves the scope of our 
jurisdiction in question, we will remand the case to the BIA for 
further consideration.”). 
58 See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144 at 152.    
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1959(a)(6) has little in common with the offenses in § 1962. 
 
Section 1962 has four subsections.  Subsection (a) 
relates to receiving and investing money from a racketeering 
enterprise.  Quinteros’s conviction does not have as an element 
the investing of money.  Subsections (b) and (c) require “a 
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful 
debt.”59  Racketeering activity is defined as “any act or threat 
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, 
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a 
controlled substance or listed chemical”60 or any of a number 
of offenses defined in other statutes—of which § 1959 is not 
one.  Nor does Quinteros’s conviction under § 1959(a)(6) have 
as an element conduct that would meet the more general 
descriptions of racketeering activity.  Lastly, subsection (d) 
criminalizes a conspiracy to violate the foregoing provisions of 
§ 1962, but because Quinteros’s conviction does not meet the 
requirements of subsections (a) through (c), he likewise could 
not have been convicted under § 1962(d).  Thus, Quinteros’s 
conviction is not a categorical match for any of the statutory 
offenses listed in § 1101(a)(43)(J) and is not an aggravated 
felony.       
 
C. The BIA erred in its CAT finding. 
Having determined that Quinteros did not commit an 
aggravated felony, we will remand this case to the Board.  
However, before remanding, we need to discuss the standard 
to be applied by the Board in determining state acquiescence.  
                                                 
59 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), (c). 
60 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 
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Quinteros argues that the Board erred in applying the standard 
we enunciated in Myrie61 because the Board failed to make the 
required findings and applied the wrong legal standard for state 
acquiescence.  Quinteros’s argument that the Board applied the 
wrong legal standard for acquiescence is a legal challenge that 
we review de novo,62 as is our review of the sufficiency of the 
Board’s findings under the standard we enunciated in Myrie.63    
 
Quinteros also argues that the Board erred by ignoring 
evidence relevant to the Myrie analysis.  Generally, an agency 
is required to consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility 
of future torture,”64 but “the IJ and BIA need not ‘discuss every 
piece of evidence mentioned by an asylum applicant.’”65  
Although it is usually sufficient to say, as the IJ did here, that 
“[a]ll evidence and testimony has been considered, even if not 
specifically addressed in the decision below,”66 the agency 
“may not ignore evidence favorable to the alien.”67  And “[i]f 
[evidence] is to be disregarded, we need to know why.”68  We 
will examine whether the IJ ignored evidence under each prong 
                                                 
61  855 F.3d 509. 
62 Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 671 F.3d 
303 (3d Cir. 2011). 
63 See Green v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 694 F.3d 503 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
64 Green, 694 F.3d at 508 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). 
65 Green, 694 F.3d at 509 (quoting Huang v. Att’y Gen. of the 
United States, 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
66 AR 127.  See Green, 694 F.3d at 509. 
67 Huang, 620 F.3d at 388 (citing Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y 
Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
68 Myrie, 855 F.3d at 518. 
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of Myrie.   
 
 Myrie set forth two prongs that the Board must answer 
when evaluating a CAT claim.  First, the agency must 
determine “whether an applicant has met the burden of 
establishing that it is more likely than not [the alien] would be 
tortured if removed.”69  Second, the agency asks whether 
public officials will acquiesce in the likely treatment.70  We 
will examine the errors under each prong of Myrie in turn.    
 
1. Errors under Myrie Prong 1 
 Quinteros argues that the Board failed to determine 
what would likely happen to him upon his return to El Salvador 
and whether what would likely happen would constitute 
torture.  Under prong one, the agency determines whether an 
alien would likely be “tortured if removed.”71  Answering that 
question requires two steps: (1) the agency must examine 
“what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed” and (2) 
the agency must decide whether “what is likely to happen 
amount[s] to the legal definition of torture.”72   
                                                 
69 Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516. 
70 Id.  
71 Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516. 
72 Id.  “For an act to constitute torture under the [CAT] and the 
implementing regulations, it must be: (1) an act causing severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; 
(3) for an illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and 
(5) not arising from lawful sanctions.” Auguste v. Ridge, 395 
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 Quinteros argues that the Board erred in ignoring 
numerous pieces of evidence in evaluating his CAT claim.  In 
reversing the IJ’s finding that Quinteros would likely be 
tortured or killed in El Salvador, the Board made three 
findings.  First, the Board concluded that Quinteros had not 
shown that he was likely to “be identified either as a current or 
former gang member.”73  Second, the Board found that his 
tattoo was not likely to be discovered because it can be covered 
while in public.  And third, the Board concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence that a New York Yankees tattoo was a 
recognized gang symbol.   
 
The Board erred in ignoring evidence about Quinteros’s 
tattoo.  The Board concluded that gang members would not be 
able to identify Quinteros based on his tattoo because his tattoo 
could be covered by clothing.  But the Board made no mention 
of the practice that Quinteros, Dr. Boerman, and the Harvard 
study discussed:  Police and gangs force suspected gang 
members to strip down so they can search them for tattoos.  The 
Board also erred in ignoring evidence about the significance of 
Quinteros’s tattoo.  The Board stated that Quinteros had not 
introduced evidence “[a]part from his own testimony and the 
testimony of his expert witness” regarding the significance of 
his New York Yankees tattoo.74  Yet the Harvard study spoke 
at length about the significance of tattoos.75  That is grounds 
                                                 
F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Matter of J–E–, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. 291, 297 (BIA 2002)). 
73 AR 5. 
74 AR 6. 
75 Although the Harvard study did not address the significance 
of a New York Yankees tattoo specifically, it discussed the 
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for a remand.76   
 
 Quinteros’s argument that the Board failed to determine 
what would likely happen to him upon return to El Salvador 
and whether that would constitute torture is not quite as clear-
cut.  Quinteros’s theory of why he would be harmed upon 
returning to El Salvador was premised on state and nonstate 
actors recognizing his gang affiliation and acting, or failing to 
act, based on it.  But even though the Board found that others 
were not likely to recognize Quinteros as a gang member, the 
Board was required to determine whether what was “likely to 
happen” would constitute torture.77  Because, however, the 
Board failed to consider evidence that would have undermined 
its conclusion that Quinteros was unlikely to be recognized as 
a gang member, the Board must conduct its Myrie analysis 
anew. 
 
2. Errors under Myrie Prong 2 
 Quinteros also argues that neither the Board nor the IJ 
made any factual findings as to how public officials would 
                                                 
significance of tattoos generally, including that “individuals 
with tattoos, gang-related or not, often fear being targeted for 
arbitrary arrests and detentions in El Salvador.”  AR 1265. 
76 See Green, 694 F.3d at 508–09.     
77 See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516 (quoting Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 
602 F.3d at 271) (noting that when the IJ makes a 
determination under the first prong of Myrie, “the IJ must 
address two questions: “(1) what is likely to happen to the 
petitioner if removed; and (2) does what is likely to happen 
amount to the legal definition of torture?”). 
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likely respond and that the Board and IJ applied the wrong 
legal standard for acquiescence.  In determining whether public 
officials will acquiesce to torture, Myrie requires an analysis of 
“how public officials will likely act in response to the harm the 
petitioner fears” and “whether the likely response from public 
officials qualifies as acquiescence.”78   
 
The Board primarily adopted the IJ’s reasoning as to 
how public officials would likely respond.  The IJ discussed 
Quinteros’s testimony that the police are corrupt and infiltrated 
by gangs and that Quinteros believed that his tattoo would be 
taken as a gang signal.  The Board and IJ discussed some 
positive steps the Salvadoran government was taking to 
combat gang violence.  But neither the IJ nor the Board came 
to a decision about how public officials would likely respond 
to the treatment that Quinteros feared.  That requires a remand.     
   
Quinteros also claims that the Board and IJ applied the 
wrong legal standard for acquiescence because they focused on 
the government’s efforts rather than the results of those efforts.  
The IJ determined that the Salvadoran government would not 
acquiesce in Quinteros’s torture because of the government 
had increased its efforts to address gang violence and reduce 
corruption in the police force.  Although the IJ noted the 
uncertainty as to the success of these efforts, the IJ nevertheless 
found that these increased efforts showed that the government 
would not acquiesce in Quinteros’s torture.  The Board adopted 
this reasoning and again emphasized the Salvadoran 
government’s positive efforts.  We have previously made clear 
to the BIA that a government can acquiesce in torture despite 
                                                 
78 Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516.  
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opposing the group inflicting the harm.79  Indeed, although 
“not dispositive of” whether a government acquiesced in 
torture through willful blindness, “an applicant may be able to 
establish governmental acquiescence in some circumstances, 
even where the government is unable to protect its citizens 
from persecution.”80  The Board was required to consider 
whether the government of El Salvador is capable of 
preventing the harm Quinteros would likely face. 
 
IV. 
Having concluded that Quinteros’s conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6) is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), or (J), Quinteros is not removable as 
charged.  We therefore grant Quinteros’s petition for review 
and vacate the Board’s final removal order,81 and remand this 
case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
                                                 
79 See, e.g., Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d at 312 (“[A]n 
applicant can establish governmental acquiescence even if the 
government opposes the paramilitary organization that is 
engaged in torturous acts.”); Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. of 
United States, 527 F.3d 330, 351 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The mere 
fact that the Colombian government is engaged in a protracted 
civil war with the FARC does not necessarily mean that it 
cannot remain willfully blind to the torturous acts of the 
FARC.”). 
80 Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d at 311. 
81 See, e.g., Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 163 (3d Cir. 
2012) (holding that the petitioner was not convicted of an 
aggravated felony and vacating the removal order). 
1 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges Ambro and Roth 
join, concurring. 
  
I join my colleagues’ thoughtful opinion in its entirety.  
I write separately because I think it is as necessary as it is 
important to emphasize the manner in which the BIA dismissed 
Quinteros’ claim that he would be tortured (and perhaps killed) 
if sent back to El Salvador.  For reasons I will explain below, 
it is difficult for me to read this record and conclude that the 
Board was acting as anything other than an agency focused on 
ensuring Quinteros’ removal rather than as the neutral and fair 
tribunal it is expected to be.  That criticism is harsh and I do 
not make it lightly. 
 
The BIA’s puzzling conclusions concerning Quinteros’ 
New York Yankees tattoo, although not the sole cause of my 
concern, illustrate the reasons I feel compelled to write 
separately.  I will therefore begin by discussing the BIA’s 
decision-making process concerning this tattoo. 
I. 
 
 As Judge Roth notes, Quinteros testified that his New 
York Yankees tattoo would identify him as a former gang 
member.1  He also produced corroborating testimony to that 
effect from an expert witness and a study from the Harvard 
Law School International Rights Clinic.  The first Immigration 
Judge to consider this evidence—which was apparently 
undisputed by the government—did so carefully and ultimately 
concluded that Quinteros “[h]as shown a clear likelihood that 
he would be killed or tortured by members of MS-13 and 18th 
Street gangs.”2  This finding was affirmed by the BIA upon its 
first review of Quinteros’ case,3 and affirmed again by the 
second IJ after we remanded for consideration in light of 
                                              
1 Maj. Op. at 4-5. 
2 JA125.  The IJ also found the expert testimony convincing: 
“Dr. Boerman’s testimony persuasively illustrates how the 
Respondent could be mistaken for a gang member, since most 
gang members have tattoos, and there is a large number of 
MS-13 members in El Salvador . . .” Id. 
3 JA130 (“We adopt and affirm the Immigration Judge’s 
decision.”). 
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Myrie.4  Thus, two IJs and a Board member had previously 
examined and accepted this finding.  Yet, for reasons that are 
not at all apparent, the BIA suddenly reversed that conclusion 
upon this fourth review. 
 
In an explanation that is both baffling and dismaying, 
the BIA now claims: “Apart from his own testimony and the 
testimony of his expert witness, the record is devoid of any 
objective evidence establishing that a person with a New York 
Yankees tattoo without any other gang identifying marks will 
be identified as a . . . gang member and subjected to torture.”5  
I am at a loss to understand what the BIA is referring to by 
requiring “objective” evidence.  The IJ whose order was being 
reviewed had held that Quinteros was credible, stating: “Based 
on a review of the totality of evidence, the Court finds that 
Respondent’s testimony was consistent with the record and he 
was forthright with the Court regarding his past membership in 
MS-13 gang.  Thus, the Court finds Respondent credible.”6  
Moreover, there was nothing to suggest that Quinteros’ 
testimony lacked credibility regarding any aspect of his fear of 
MS-13 or how gang members would interpret his tattoo, and 
neither IJ suggested anything to the contrary.7 
 
The BIA properly states the applicable standard of 
review of an IJ’s credibility finding is “clear error,”8 but 
nowhere does it suggest any basis for finding such error in 
either IJs’ determination.  I am therefore unable to ascertain 
any justification for the BIA’s sudden reversal after the three 
previous cycles of review all arrived at the opposite 
conclusion.  I also remain baffled by the BIA’s usage of 
“objective evidence.”  The firsthand testimony of the victim of 
any crime is probative evidence if it is credible9—the issue is 
                                              
4 JA14. 
5 JA5 (emphasis added). 
6 JA12. 
7 See JA 14 (second IJ’s conclusion that Quinteros was 
credible); JA118 (first IJ’s conclusion that Quinteros was 
credible); see also Pet. Br. 41-42. 
8 See BIA Opinion at JA2 (citing C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)). 
9 For example, in statutory rape cases, fully half of the states 
(including Pennsylvania, where Quinteros is being held) have 
abolished their rules requiring corroboration.  The victim’s 
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the credibility of the witness.  Once a witness’s testimony is 
found to be credible, it cannot arbitrarily be rejected merely to 
achieve a particular result.  Even more salient, the BIA’s 
rejection of Quinteros’ credible testimony is inconsistent with 
controlling precedent and the regulations governing CAT 
relief.10  Those regulations state: “[t]he testimony of the 
applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden 
of proof without corroboration.”11  Thus, it is clear that 
corroborative evidence may not be necessary.  In this case, 
where the testimony of the applicant is credible and is not 
questioned in any way, there is no reason to need 
corroboration. 
 
Accordingly, Quinteros’ testimony should have been 
sufficient proof of any dispute about his tattoo even if he could 
be described as lacking objectivity.  Moreover, there was 
nothing offered to suggest that the expert witness or the report 
of the Harvard Clinic was anything less than objective.  It is 
impossible to discern from the record why the BIA refused to 
accept that external evidence.  Moreover, given its apparent 
disregard for these three distinct, previously accepted pieces of 
evidence, I seriously doubt whether any evidence would have 
been capable of changing the agency’s analysis.  Thus, it is the 
BIA’s own objectivity that concerns me here. 
The agency’s discussion of the location of Quinteros’ 
tattoo heightens these concerns.  First, the BIA expressed 
                                              
account, if credible, is sufficient. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
3106 (2018) (“The testimony of a complainant need not be 
corroborated in prosecutions under [Pennsylvania criminal 
law]. No instructions shall be given cautioning the jury to 
view the complainant's testimony in any other way than that 
in which all complainants' testimony is viewed.”); Vitauts M. 
Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Regarding 
Necessity for Corroboration of Victim's Testimony in 
Prosecution for Sexual Offense, 31 A.L.R. 4th 120 § 4[a] 
(1984). 
10  See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 
582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011) (accepting as objective evidence the 
testimony of the petitioner alone); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 
123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (accepting as “objective” the 
“[e]vidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant . . .”). 
11 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. 
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skepticism because the record does not contain a photograph 
of the tattoo, “or a description of its size and design.”12  It 
faulted Quinteros for not establishing that the tattoo is 
“publicly visible,” and stated, “[t]he record simply indicates 
that he has a tattoo on his right arm.”13  Yet, the Government 
never contested the existence of the tattoo and, as I have 
explained, Quinteros’ testimony about it was accepted as 
credible by the IJ.   
 
Then the BIA objected that Quinteros never “clearly 
specified the location of his New York Yankees tattoo and his 
expert witness did not know its location.”14  However, two 
sentences later, the BIA states that “[t]he Record . . . simply 
indicates that he [Quinteros] has a tattoo on his right arm.”15  
Therefore, not only was there never a dispute about the 
existence of the tattoo, there was also no dispute as to its 
location, and the BIA’s abortive suggestions to the contrary are 
simply inconsistent with a fair and neutral analysis of 
Quinteros’ claim.  Finally, even if one sets that all aside, I can 
find no reasonable basis for the BIA to suppose that the specific 
design of the tattoo or testimony about its size was even 
necessary.  Whatever its exact appearance, it was uncontested 
that it was a New York Yankees tattoo.   And as noted by Judge 
Roth, the record had established that awareness of gang use of 
tattoos is so prevalent in El Salvador that individuals are 
routinely forced by police and rival gangs to remove their 
clothing for inspection of any tattoos that may be present.16  It 
therefore pains me to conclude that the BIA simply ignored 
evidence in an effort to find that Quinteros’ tattoo would not 
place him in peril as it was underneath his clothing.17  
II. 
                                              
12 JA5. 
13 JA5. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Maj. Op. at 22; see also JA61, 90-91, 162.  Overlooking so 
obvious an inference of danger—arising from the undisputed 
existence of Quinteros’ tattoo—contradicts our directive that 
“the BIA must provide an indication that it considered such 
evidence, and if the evidence is rejected, an explanation as to 
why . . .” Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2014). 
17 JA5.  
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 As troubling as the mishandling of Quinteros’ evidence 
might be standing alone, the BIA’s errors here are not an 
isolated occurrence.  There are numerous examples of its 
failure to apply the binding precedent of this Circuit 
delineating the proper procedure for evaluating CAT appeals.18  
Indeed, that framework has been mishandled, or simply absent, 
from several BIA opinions in the two years since we explicitly 
emphasized its importance in Myrie.19 
 
 As Judge Roth explains, Myrie instituted a two-part 
inquiry for evaluating whether a claim qualifies for relief under 
CAT.  She describes the steps required and the points which 
must be addressed;20 we normally accept the BIA’s well-
reasoned conclusions on each of these points, however, 
“[t]he BIA must substantiate its decisions. We 
will not accord the BIA deference where its 
findings and conclusions are based on inferences 
                                              
18 For our particular decisions on this topic, see Myrie v. Att’y 
Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017); Pieschacon-Villegas v. 
Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2011). 
19 Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516 (requiring the BIA to follow the 
process we have delineated, as, “[i]n order for us to be able to 
give meaningful review to the BIA’s decision, we must have 
some insight into its reasoning.”) (quoting Awolesi v. 
Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Among the 
examples of BIA error, see Serrano Vargas v. Att’y Gen., No. 
17-2424, 2019 WL 5691807, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2019) 
(finding it “unclear” whether the BIA followed our 
precedent); Guzman v. Att’y Gen., 765 F. App’x. 721 (3d Cir. 
2019) (finding ultimately non-determinative an incorrect 
application of the Myrie and Pieschacon-Villegas standards 
which had been summarily affirmed by the BIA); Zheng v. 
Att’y Gen., 759 F. App’x. 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2019) (requiring 
the appeals court to read between the lines of the BIA opinion 
to understand whether the conclusion satisfied the Myrie test); 
Antunez v. Att’y Gen., 729 F. App’x. 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(concluding the BIA applied the wrong standard of review 
under Myrie). 
20 Maj. Op, at 21. 
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or presumptions that are not reasonably 
grounded in the record.”21 
 
In other words, the BIA cannot act arbitrarily.  We 
expect that it will “examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its actions, including a ‘rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”22  
Here, as already seen, the BIA’s conclusions fell far short of 
that low bar.  According deference would therefore be to 
compound a mistaken application of law. 
 
 The BIA’s misapplication of Myrie here is consistent 
with other examples.  Beginning with the first prong of Myrie’s 
first question (what will happen if a petitioner is removed to 
his or her country of origin), the BIA ignored evidence in the 
record.   I have already discussed much of its tattoo analysis.23  
Similarly, the BIA simplistically concluded that because 
Quinteros left El Salvador when he was a boy, he would not be 
recognized by El Salvadorian gangs upon his return.24  That 
conclusion was clearly contradicted in the record by credible 
and undisputed evidence that Quinteros knows “at least 70” 
current or former gang members in the United States who were 
deported to El Salvador and would recognize him there.25  The 
BIA was required to at least review the evidence Quinteros 
offered and provide a non-arbitrary reason for rejecting it.26   
 
                                              
21 Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Sheriff v. Att'y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 589 (3d Cir. 
2009)). 
22 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington 
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
23 JA5. 
24 JA4.  The BIA strangely maintains in the face of the 
evidence presented that “[Quinteros] has not clearly 
articulated exactly how anyone in El Salvador will remember 
or recognize him . . .” id. 
25 JA63-64.   
26 Huang, 620 F.3d at 388 (“The BIA simply failed to address 
any evidence that, if credited, would lend support to 
[Petitioner’s case], and thus the decision does not reflect a 
consideration of the record as a whole.”). 
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And the errors do not stop there.  Because it had not 
substantively addressed the testimony offered above, the BIA 
was left without substantive findings on which to determine 
Question II of the Myrie framework: does what will likely 
happen to a petitioner amount to torture?  As Judge Roth makes 
clear, the BIA is required to conduct both steps of the Myrie 
analysis.27  By declining to reach clear findings of what would 
happen upon removal, the BIA prevented itself from then being 
able to determine whether those results met the legal standard 
for torture.  The Myrie framework cannot be so easily evaded. 
 
Lastly, to briefly reiterate Judge Roth’s important 
observations regarding Myrie’s second prong,28 a proper 
inquiry must “take[] into account our precedent that an 
applicant can establish governmental acquiescence even if the 
government opposes the [group] engaged in torturous acts.”29  
This is only logical, as few countries admit to torturing and 
killing their citizens, even when privately condoning such 
conduct.  Thus, if we simply took countries at their word, there 
would barely be anywhere on the globe where CAT could 
apply.  We have previously made clear that this is the proper 
inquiry to determine acquiescence and have remanded based 
on the BIA’s failure to look past the stated policies of a given 
government.30  Other Circuit Courts of Appeals have done the 
same.31  The BIA is thus on notice that results, not press 
                                              
27 Maj. Op, at 23 (citing Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516). 
28 Maj. Op, at 24-25. 
29 Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 312 
(2011). 
30 See, e.g., Guerrero v. Att’y Gen., 672 F. App’x 188, 191 
(3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Torres-Escalantes v. Att’y Gen., 
632 F. App’x 66, 69 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam).  
31 Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 363 (9th Cir. 
2017); Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1140 
(7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is success rather than effort that bears on 
the likelihood of the petitioner’s being killed or tortured if 
removed”); Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 510 (9th Cir. 
2013) (“If public officials at the state and local level in 
Mexico would acquiesce in any torture [petitioner] is likely to 
suffer, this satisfies CAT’s requirement that a public official 
acquiesce in the torture, even if the federal government . . . 
would not similarly acquiescence.”); De La Rosa v. Holder, 
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releases or public statements, are what drive the test for 
acquiescence under Myrie. 
III. 
 
In Quinteros’ case, as has happened before, “[t]he 
BIA’s opinion frustrates our ability to reach any conclusion . . 
.”32  In Cruz, we stated that “the BIA’s cursory analysis ignored 
the central argument in [Petitioner’s] motion to reopen that he 
was no longer removable for committing a crime of moral 
turpitude.”33  In Kang, we disapproved when “[t]he BIA 
ignored overwhelming probative evidence . . . its findings were 
not reasonably grounded in the record and thus . . . . [t]he BIA's 
determination was not based on substantial evidence.”34  In 
Huang, we complained when “[t]he BIA’s analysis [did] little 
more than cherry-pick a few pieces of evidence, state why that 
evidence does not support a well-founded fear of persecution 
and conclude that [petitioner’s] asylum petition therefore lacks 
merit. That is selective rather than plenary review.”35  There 
are simply too many additional examples of such errors to feel 
confident in an administrative system established for the fair 
and just resolution of immigration disputes.36  Most disturbing, 
                                              
598 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is not clear . . . why 
the preventative efforts of some government actors should 
foreclose the possibility of government acquiescence, as a 
matter of law, under the CAT.”). 
32 Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 2006). 
33 Id. 
34 Kang, 611 F.3d at 167. 
35 Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010). 
36 See, e.g., Huang Bastardo-Vale v. Att’y Gen., 934 F.3d 255, 
259 n.1 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (castigating the BIA for its 
“blatant disregard of the binding regional precedent . . .”); 
Mayorga v. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 126, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(reversing a BIA decision without remand and observing that 
“[i]deally the BIA would have provided more analysis, 
explaining why it accepted the IJ’s (erroneous) reasoning . . 
.”) (alteration in original); Quao Lin Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 
F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding the BIA “erred by 
misapplying the law regarding when corroboration is 
necessary . . .”); Gallimore v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 216, 221 
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that “[t]he BIA's analysis in all 
likelihood rests on an historically inaccurate premise . . . . the 
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these failures gravely affect the rights of petitioners, such as 
Quinteros, who allege that they will face torture or death if 
removed to their country of origin.   
IV. 
 
Although the BIA is “[n]ot a statutory body . . .”37 it has 
been described as “[t]he single most important decision-maker 
in the immigration system.”38  I doubt that any court or any 
other administrative tribunal so regularly addresses claims of 
life-changing significance, often involving consequences of 
life and death.   It is therefore particularly important that the 
opinions of the BIA fairly and adequately resolve the legal 
arguments raised by the parties and render decisions based only 
upon the record and the law.   
 
I understand and appreciate that the BIA’s task is made 
more difficult by the incredible caseload foisted upon it, and 
the fact that BIA members (and IJs for that matter) are 
horrendously overworked.39  But administrative shortcomings 
                                              
BIA's opinion fails adequately to explain its reasoning and, in 
any event, appears incorrect as a matter of law.”).  Nor is this 
a concern of recent vintage, the BIA has been on notice for 
well over a decade.  See, e.g., Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 
231, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he BIA in this case has failed 
even to provide us with clues that would indicate why or how 
[petitioner] failed to meet his burden of proof.  As a result, 
‘the BIA’s decision provides us with no way to conduct our . . 
. review.’”) (quoting Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 555 
(3d Cir. 2001)); Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 555 (“[T]he availability 
of judicial review (which is specifically provided in the INA) 
necessarily contemplates something for us to review . . . . the 
BIA's failure of explanation makes [this] impossible . . .”) 
(emphasis in original). 
37 Anna O. Law, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN 
COURTS 23 (2010) (citing unpublished internal history of the 
BIA). 
38 Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United 
States Post September 11, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
323, 353 (2005). 
39 See Am. Bar Ass'n, Comm'n on Immigration, 2019 Update 
Report: Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to 
Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and 
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can never justify denying the parties a fair and impartial 
hearing, or excuse allowing adjudications to devolve into a 
mere formality before removal.   
 
I would like to be able to feel comfortable that the 
lopsided outcomes in immigration proceedings40 reflect the 
merits of the claims for relief raised there rather than the 
proverbial “rush to judgment.”  Thus, on remand, I can only 
hope that Quinteros’ claims are heard by more careful and 
judicious ears than he was afforded in this appearance. 
                                              
Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, Vol. 
1, 20-21 (2019), available at https://www.naij-
usa.org/images/uploads/newsroom/ABA_2019_reforming_th
e_immigration_system_volume_1.pdf (noting the continued 
heavy caseload of the BIA, with an increasing number of 
appeals likely in the near future, and a resulting tendency to 
dispose of cases with single-member opinions that address 
only a single issue in the case). 
40 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 359-61 (2007) 
(reporting that between 2001 and 2005, the BIA’s rate of 
granting asylum fell by up to 84%, with some categories of 
applicants receiving asylum only 5% of the time).  
